SUMMARY TEST

Allamah had written various books, one of which is a summary on a book written by Sheikh Tūsī; based on the topic of duā, called Misbāh al-Mutahajjid. Allamah Hillī summarized and organized this book in to 10 sections, and named it Mukhtasar Minhaj al-Salah fi Mukhtasar al-Misbah. Later he decided to add another section to these 10 sections and named it Babul Hādī ‘Ashar, which means the eleventh chapter. Approximately 20 commentaries were written on this chapter. We are to study the one written by Fāḍil Miqdād.
Introduction to the science of Kalām (Islamic Theology):
There are different theories regarding how Islamic Theology was initially called Kalām. One theory proposes that it is because of the early discussions about the Kalām (word) of Allah. For example, whether the word of God is eternal or created? The other theory is that because scholars used to say, “Kalāmunā…” which means “Our view about this issue is…” Therefore, it became known as the science of Kalām either because it began with discussions about the word of God or because of the famous phrase of early scholars.
Importance of achieving Ma‘rifah (Knowledge of Allah)
Allah (SWT) did not create any being in vain. He (SWT) has mentioned in the Holy Qur’an:
وَمَا خَلَقْتُ الْجِنَّ وَالْإِنسَ إِلَّا لِيَعْبُدُونِ
“I did not create the Jinn and the Humans except that they may worship Me.” (51:56)
There is a hierarchy of purposes. It is compulsory for every intelligent being to respond to the Lord of the worlds. As it is not possible to worship Him (SWT) without knowing Him with certitude. Therefore, the Ulamā are responsible to teach people about Allah (SWT) by compiling good introductory texts about Almighty Allah for them to read and gain a better understanding of Him. One such text is Babul Hādī ‘Ashar, a work of our noble and honorable scholar, Allamah Hillī. This text, although brief, is still full of knowledge.

Arabic terminologies in Kalām
Poverty افتقار
Existence وجود
Necessity وجوب
Contingent beings ممکنات
Created مصنوع
Firmness اِحکام
Transcendent متعالی
Resemblance مشابهة
Glory المنزّه
Imperfect beings ناقصات
Resemblance مناسبة
Overwhelming, abundant المتظاهرات
Frequent المتواترات
Confusions شبهات
Impossible متعذّر
Too difficult متعسّر
Make alert تنبیه
To Guide ارشاد
Make things clear تنقیح
Make things precise تدقیق
One who gives a report مقرّر
One who refines مهذّب
Incidents بوائق
What blocks صادّ

The obligation (Wujūb) of learning the principles of religion (Usūl Dīn)
Wujūb literally means to ‘come down’, but technically means ‘obligation’. Wājib is one of the two types:
1. Obligatory on everyone as individuals.
2. Obligatory on everyone as a community; such that if one person performs it then the others are freed from the obligation.
Usūl is plural of ‘Asl, which means root and foundation. Usūl al-Dīn are the pillars of religion on which the religion rests upon; such that if any one of these pillars were to not exist then religion in its entirety would lose its meaning and purpose.
Ma‘rifah of Usūl al-Dīn meaning knowledge of the Principles of religion is from the first type of obligations. Meaning it is compulsory for every individual Muslim.
Dīn literally means ‘reward’ or ‘punishment’. Something that you receive as the outcome of your action. It technically means ‘path’ or ‘religion’. This discipline is called Usūl al-Dīn because all other religious sciences are based on it and all these sciences depend on truthfulness of the Prophet (PBUHF) and the truthfulness of the Messenger depends on the existence of God.
This book is about the science of Theology in which unicity of God, His attributes, and Prophet-hood are discussed.

In Sunnism, it is said that Prophet Muhammad (PBUHF) said:
«لاتجتمع امتی علی خطاء»
“My Ummah does not gather on falsehood”
However, this Hadīth (narration), even if it is authentic, there is no documentation for it. It cannot solve the problem, because that which the Muslim world are in a consensus about are mainly Badīhīyyat meaning the obvious such as “Prayers is obligatory”. Since there are only a few consensual beliefs, as a result some people claim, “it means the consensus of the people of Medina” or “consensus of scholars from a certain denomination” however these claims are without basis and aren’t mentioned in the narrations (Hadīth) of the Prophet (PBUHF).
Shia Muslims believe that consensus by itself cannot be a decisive argument (Hujjah). It is possible that everyone in consensus may be mistaken. However, if through this consensus, we can reach the view of an infallible person (Ma‘sūm) then that consensus is a decisive argument as it is supported by an infallible that cannot be wrong.
Arguments for the Obligation of Gaining Ma’rifah
The arguments for obligation of gaining Ma‘rifah are both intellectual and scripture-based.
Intellectual arguments:
1. The first argument is the necessity to protect ourselves from being wrong, being oblivious to the reality of existence, our purpose. As well as the necessity of protecting ourselves from fear of misguidance due to disagreements in beliefs among people.
2. The necessity of being thankful to the one who bestows bounties and blessings upon us. Common human courtesy requires that we thank someone who gives us something. In order to thank we need to understand what is bestowed and the bestower. Therefore, to thank the bestower, if we understand what is bestowed as good, or to reject the bestower, if we do not see goodness in his bestowal. Either way, knowledge of the bestower is necessary and one who does not thank has not fulfilled the proper human courtesy. They are, therefore, blamable.

The Scripture-based Arguments:
«فَاعْلَمْ أَنَّهُ لَا إِلَـهَ إِلَّا اللَّـهُ»
“Know that there is no god except Allah.” (47:19)

The verb “اعلم” is a command to know and it shows the obligation (Wujūb) of learning.

إِنَّ فِي خَلْقِ السَّمَاوَاتِ وَالْأَرْضِ وَاخْتِلَافِ اللَّيْلِ وَالنَّهَارِ لَآيَاتٍ لِّأُولِي الْأَلْبَابِ
“Indeed, in the creation of the heavens and the earth and the alternation of night and day, certainly there are signs for those who possess intellect” (3:190)
Prophet Muhammad (PBUHF) said:
«ویل لمن لاکها بین لحییه ثمّ لم یتدبرها»
Woe to those who recite it but then don’t contemplate deeply on it.
As Prophet Muhammad (PBUHF) has denounced any lack of contemplation on this verse which highlights the significance of understanding the signs of Allah. This shows gaining knowledge and intellection are obligatory (Wājib).
Types of Knowledge
Knowledge is either self-evident, which means it doesn’t need any argument because they are obvious or they’re not self-evident and thus needs arguments to be proven.

Ma‘rifah (Knowledge) of God is not self-evident. It is necessary to present arguments for it. For example; if preparing the prerequisites for performing a Wājib Mutlaq act (an absolute obligation) is not obligatory, then we have to discuss whether according to Allah’s will, does that absolutely obligatory act remain obligatory or not? If we say, it remains obligatory, it means we have been asked to do something which we’re not able to do. If it doesn’t remain obligatory then it contradicts our assumption that it is obligatory. Therefore, discussion related to God are not obvious and self-evident and we must learn and discuss to reach the truth about Allah.

Argumentation
The process of argumentation is arranging what you know to reach an unknown conclusion. The following is an example:
1. There is design in the world.
2. Design necessitates a designer.
Conclusion: The world must have a designer.
This is argumentation; using the known premises no.1 and no.2 to reach an unknown conclusion.
Taqlīd (Emulation) is prohibited
Taqlid (emulation) means to follow others and take them as conclusive authority without gaining personal conviction. In other words, submitting to their views, solely because they said so.
The reasons for the invalidity of emulation in beliefs are obvious. Some of them being that the general masses do not know the truth and often contradict each other. They themselves need guidance then how can they be followed blindly? Even if the emulated person be infallible then still it is wrong to emulate them because beliefs are what convinces our minds about what is the truth and reality of existence. We need logical conviction about the reality of existence or else we will not benefit from mere superficial attestation of others’ beliefs.

Allah the exalted has denounced emulating others in beliefs;
Quran 2:170
He not only blamed emulation, but also encourages studying and stresses upon argumentation;
39:9
9:122
4:174
2:111
21:24
27:64

(The previous verses were not clear enough. so, I’ve added these Quranic references, please copy and paste some of them here as I do not have the required tool to copy and paste Arabic).

Therefore, every individual must learn theology for themselves and it is not sufficient to be Muslim because our forefathers were Muslim.

Chapter One: Argument for the Existence of the Necessary Existent
The three possibilities for every concept:
The existence of a concept can only be one of the three possibilities:
1. It is a necessary existent (Wājib al-Wujūd)
2. It is a possible existent (Mumkin al-Wujūd)
3. It is an impossible existent (Mumtani‘al-Wujūd)

Preliminaries for the Existence of the Necessary Existent (Wājib al-Wujūd)
The ultimate goal is to prove the Creator the High. That’s why Allama Hillī started with the existence of God. As a preliminary he has brought an introduction about the division of concepts because the argument needs the following introduction:
Regarding existents outside, they are either existing by their essence, independent of a cause or they are dependent on a cause for existence.
Regarding mental concepts; their existence too can be either necessary (Wājib), possible (Mumkin), or impossible (Mumtani). A possible existent needs a cause for its existence or even non-existence; in fact, non-existence of the cause for existence, is the cause of its non-existence.
عدم العلّه عله للعدم

Every contingent being needs a cause for its existence. Let’s say the cause for A is B. Now we ask about B, whether it is a contingent or an incontingent being? If it is incontingent, then we have proved the existence of the necessary existent (Wājib al-wujūd) and if it is contingent, we ask about its cause. We continue asking the same question and it finally has to stop somewhere. At the end, we must reach to an existent that does not need any other cause for its existence. It has existence as a part of its essence, and we call it Wājib al-Wujūd li dhātih (Necessary existent by essence).
It is the opposite of Wājib al-Wujūd li ghayrih (Necessary existent by other than its essence); this term is used for all possible existents (Mumkināt) because their existence become necessary after the existence of their causes.

The Different Types of Mumtani‘ al-wujūd (Impossible existents)
Impossible existents can also be categorized into li dhātih (By essence) or li ghayrih (By other than its essence). Mumtani‘al-Wujūd li dhātih is like a partner for God or a son being his own father; it cannot exist by itself because the concept in its essence is contradictory.

Mumtani‘al-Wujūd li ghayrih is whatever that doesn’t exist because its cause isn’t existing.

Mumkin al-Wujūd (Possible existents)
A possible existent is possible by itself, exclusively. However, if the cause exists then it is either given necessity of existence or necessity of non-existence. For example, water; it is possible in itself, yet when the causes of water are present then it necessitates the existence of water, but if the causes of water are non-existent then it necessitates the non-existence of water.

However, if it is possible to be predicated with existence, either its existence is necessary or not. If its existence is necessary then it is called Wājib al-Wujūd li dhātih (necessary existent by essence) which is Allah (SWT), or its existence is possible which is called Mumkin al-Wujūd li dhātih (Possible existent by essence).
The modifier “li dhātih” (By essence) is brought in order to distinguish it from Wājib li ghayrih; something which become Wājib (Necessary) due to the existence of its cause. Such as the existence of an effect which becomes necessary when the complete cause is there. It is the same with Mumtani‘al-Wujūd li dhātih (Impossible existent by essence) and Mumtani‘al-Wujūd li ghayrih (Impossible existent by other than its essence). These two categories Wājib li ghayrih and Mumtani‘li ghayrih fall under Mumkin li dhātih. Meaning, that which becomes necessary or possible by other than its essence is in reality possible by itself.

A possible existent cannot be so by others, so there is no benefit of bringing “li dhātih” as a modifier. A possible existent is always so by its essence, not by another. If the modifier ‘by essence’ (li dhātih) or ‘by another’ (li ghayrih) is added, its function is only explanatory.

Characteristics of Wājib li dhātih (Necessary by essence)
A necessary existent by essence has five characteristics:
 It cannot be necessary both by essence and by another. If a possible becomes necessary by another, its existence would also be impossible without the other. Therefore, it would need a cause, and it contradicts the fact that it is necessary by its essence.
 Its existence and its necessity are not additional to it; otherwise, it would need them, and be contingent.
 The necessary existent cannot be compound and have parts, because a compound existent needs its parts which forms it, therefore being contingent.
 It cannot be part of something else, because if it was a part of something bigger than itself, it would mean it would be affected by that, and therefore be contingent.
 The necessary existent cannot be more than one.

Whereas if a concept is actually non-existent and has the potential to exist then it has become impossible to exist due to its causes being nonexistent.
Therefore, possible existents are those which are equally existent or nonexistent. If they exist or don’t exist, it is due to external causes which at this point determines necessity or impossibility, so it can no longer be categorized as ‘possible’.
 A possible existent needs a cause that brings it to existence. When both sides are equal in essence, it’s impossible that one of the two sides to actualize with no cause. Therefore, for a possible concept to become existent, it needs a cause.
A possible existent which continues existing, needs a cause for continuous existence. This is because a possible existent is a contingent existent. Therefore, its cause for continuous existence must also always continuously exist. Otherwise if the cause ceases to exist then it necessitates the nonexistence of the possible existent.
Transformation of the essence of an existent is also impossible. If something is contingent, it will always be so or vice versa.
The Theory of Hudūth
The theory of Hudūth (Becoming existent) believes to become existent, we need single occurrences. This theory has two problems:
 It means that something which is eternal like angels doesn’t need a cause.
 If Hudūth is the reason why we need a cause, then after coming to existence, we should not need the cause anymore and therefore be incontingent.
Therefore, the theory of Hudūth isn’t correct because the reason for needing causes is contingency, and contingency is permanent, even after coming to existence. Therefore, the cause which keeps everything existing must always be a cause, in every moment, in order for existents to exist. The causes cannot be one-time occurrences in the past that no longer hold have an effect.

The Cosmological Argument for the Existence of God
Without a doubt there is a cause for the existing reality. It is either a necessary existent or a possible one. If it is a necessary existent, then we have accepted the existence of the necessary existent which we call God.
If it is claimed that the originator is a possible existent, it needs an originator that gives existence to it. Then the question is; what is the originator of that possible existent? If that originator is a necessary existent, then we have accepted the existence of God. If the originator is again a possible existent, it needs another originator. Ultimately, the outcome may only be one of the following;
1. We eventually reach a cause which has existence in its essence, meaning it is a necessary existent. Therefore, God is the originator.
2. A has been created by B, and B was created by A, or even you can make the circle of causes bigger i.e. A was created by B, and B by C, and C by A. This is a vicious circle. Regardless of how large the circle of causes is, A needs A, this is logically impossible because it is contradictory in itself as A must not exist to be the effect, yet at the same time exist to be the cause. Therefore, a vicious circle of causes is logically void.
3. We reach to an endless chain of causes which is called Tasalsul (Infinite regression) and it’s impossible because increasing the number of contingent beings does not make them all incontingent. The whole lot cannot exist by itself because they are entirely contingent. Therefore, nothing must exist if this is the reality because existence does not have a start, thus infinite regression is also logically void because it merely increases the number of causes to infinity without actually proving for it all any cause.

Allah has mentioned this argument in Quran:

سَنُرِيهِمْ آيَاتِنَا فِي الْآفَاقِ وَفِي أَنفُسِهِمْ حَتَّىٰ يَتَبَيَّنَ لَهُمْ أَنَّهُ الْحَقّ
“Soon we shall show them our signs in the horizons and in their own souls until it made clear to them that indeed He is the truth.” (41:53)

Ibrahim (as) also argued using Ufūl (Change) of the sun and moon which disappears and appears again, and it implies movement and gradual change, and movement implies Hudūth. Hudūth means to be preceded by non-existence. It therefore shows that whatever is Hadith (An occurrence) needs a cause.

Cosmological Argument
The second type of argument starts directly from the concept of existence. Existence is divided to necessary (Wājib) and possible (Mumkin). We will conclude this argument when we prove the necessary existent who is the ultimate cause of all possible existents. In the Quran, there is a hint for this argument:

أَوَلَمْ يَكْفِ بِرَبِّكَ أَنَّهُ عَلَىٰ كُلِّ شَيْءٍ شَهِيدٌ
“Is it not sufficient that your Lord is witness to all things?” (41:53)

Explanation for the argument:
If you assume that the necessary existent (Wājib al-Wujūd) doesn’t exist, the implication is either a vicious circle or an endless chain of possible existents, both being void. However, we need to prove that this assumption leads to either a vicious circle or an endless chain.
There are existents in the world. If among them, there is a necessary existent then we have proven the existence of God. Otherwise, it implies that all existents are contingent, because we don’t have a third possibility.
When all of them are possible existents (Mumkin al-Wujud), we need an originator or cause to bring them to existence. If the cause is a necessary existent, we have proven the existence of God. If the cause is again a possible existent, then it becomes a vicious circle or an infinite chain of regression. If the chain doesn’t end at a necessary existent this chain of possible existents should never come into existence.
Therefore, because a vicious circle of causes or an endless chain of causes is logically void, the only remaining possibility is that it must end at a necessary existent. Reason being that a characteristic of the necessary existent is that it has existence in its essence and is therefore an uncaused causer.

Why Vicious Circle and an Infinite Regression of Causes are Void
Vicious circle means A depends on B, and B depends on A. It implies that A must exist and not exist. It must not exist to come into existence by B and at the same time it must exist in order to cause B. Therefore, it is void because it is contradictory as it requires existence and nonexistence of A at the same time.
Even if the circle of causes is longer e.g. A depends on B, B on C, and C depends on A. The gap doesn’t solve the problem because ultimately A is its own cause and effect, and this is contradictory, therefore void.

Infinite regression of causes is void because a chain of events only occurs when the first cause is caused. However if there is no uncaused causer it means the first effect is never caused. E.g. a line of dominoes is stacked yet the first domino doesn’t fall to cause the second domino to fall and so on the rest. Unless there is another cause outside the domino chain it means the fall of dominoes will never begin. Possible existents being like the dominoes, if this line of dominoes regresses for eternity it means no member of the eternal chain will fall and so there will be no movement. If a possible existent isn’t caused by an uncaused causer it would mean that nothing should exist as there is no prime causer. Infinite regression of causes is therefore void because it contradicts the reality that everything which exists, exists. Whereas infinite regression necessitates that nothing must exist as nothing has been caused, and this is not true of reality as we all do exist.

If the cause is outside, it is impossible as a possible existent cannot cause itself, so it must be a part of the chain. If the cause is a part of the chain or the whole chain itself then it is contradictory because it is both the cause and effect of itself, requiring it to exist and not exist at the same time, this is contradiction and therefore void.

If the cause is the whole chain, it is a vicious circle. If the cause is a part of the chain, it is also void because it is not possible for something to depend on its part as the part exists after the whole comes into existence. This assumption implies that something is the cause for itself, because part of a compound is the compound itself.

If the cause is outside of this chain; this theory has two problems:
One is that outside of this chain, there is no contingent being, so if there is anything outside of this chain, it would have to be the necessary existent.
The second problem is that the external cause must influence something, while it is supposed that each one of the possible existents in this chain is a cause for the one that comes after it. It leads to having two causes for one existent, to have two independent causes for one single reality is impossible. If there are two independent causes, it means they both don’t need each other to exist, each one of them is enough for creating themselves. So, when one of them is present, the effect exists without needing the other one. While we believe that the effect cannot come to existence without a cause. This is self-contradictory as both of them are contingent beings without contingency. It is claimed that they are not possible existents while it’s not possible for possible existents to be incontingent.

In conclusion, because a vicious circle and infinite regression is impossible and logically void, the necessary existent must exist, there is no other possible alternative.

Chapter Two: Allah’s Affirmative Attributes
The second chapter is on divine affirmative attributes. They are eight in total which will be discussed, starting with being free (Mukhtār).

The First Affirmative Attribute: Mukhtār
Mukhtār means the one who acts according to His free will. If Allah’s creation is always there, it implies that Allah is forced (Mūjab). Whereas in reality, this world is an occurrence (Hādith). Hādith means there was a time that this universe didn’t exist, then it came to existence.

Why this world is Hādith?
This world is Hādith because it is a physical mass. Physical mass is not free from changes and accidents, like motion and idleness that are occurrences (Hādith) because both need to be preceded by the other one. What cannot be free from changes are occurrences (Hādith) and they need a cause. Therefore, Allah didn’t want this world to exist then He wanted it to exist then He decided what to do. If Allah was forced (Mūjab) and not free, this world would have always had to exist. Because if Allah was forced, His effect didn’t disobey to exist when He existed necessarily. Therefore, either Allah is forced (Mūjab) and the world always existed, or Allah has free will (Mukhtār) and the world is an occurrence (Hādith).

Introduction on the affirmative divine attributes
An introduction must be mentioned for introducing important concepts.
Al-Qādir al-Mukhtār; One who has free will in performing an act or not.
Al-Fa’il al-Mūjab; An actor without free will.
Few differences between these two:
1. Al-Mukhtār (Free One) is the one who has free will to do or not to do. Whereas Mūjab (Obliged One) is the opposite; he is obliged and doesn’t have free will.
2. The action of a Mukhtār (Free One) is preceded by knowledge, intention, and will. He knows what he wants to do or not to do, then he decides. While Mūjab sometimes doesn’t have knowledge, and doesn’t have a choice.
3. The effects and performance of a powerful and free existent may actualize later, but an obliged existent’s actions and effects are always present with it.

Proving Allah’s attribute of being Qādir and Mukhtār
If Ālam is Muhdath, the creator must be Qādir and Mukhtār. There are two claims here that needs arguing:
1. Ālam is Muhdath (Existent preceded by nonexistence)
2. The creator of Muhdath must be Qādir and Mukhtār.

Argument for the Hudūth (Becoming existent) of this world
All the objects in this world are either physical masses or accidents (‘araḍ) such as whiteness or softness. ‘araḍ are not part of a substance, but it belongs to substances. It cannot exist without a substance. Both physical masses and accidents are Hādith. Physical objects are Hādith because they are not free from Harakah and Sukūn, which are themselves Hādith. When something is not free from qualities that are Hadīth, it must be Hadīth because a Qadīm existent cannot have created qualities.
Physical objects are not free from Harakah and Sukūn because every physical object certainly needs space. In this case, either it remains in the same space or it is moving from one place to another. So, it is either Sakin or Mutaharrik (moving); there is other possibility.
Harakah and Sukūn are Hādith, because they are preceded by one another. Qadīm cannot be preceded by another, and there is no middle position between Hādith and Qadīm. Harakah is the first presence in the second place. This is preceded by the presence in the first place. Sukūn is being for the second time in the first place. So, it is preceded by the first presence.

The second claim is: What is not free from Hādith is Hādith. If it is not Hādith it must be Qadīm. If it is Qadīm, either in the past it always had these changeable attributes, or they came later. If you say that these Hādith qualities existed with the Qadīm in eternity, they would not be Hādith as that would be contradictory. If they were not existing in eternity, it requires that something that we know for sure to be true is false and that is the impossibility of being free from Hādith existents. Therefore, physical objects are Hādith.
Accidents cannot be Qadīm either. Accidents cannot exist without physical objects because they belong to physical objects. If physical objects are Hādith, accidents must also be Hādith as a result.

The creator of Muhdath must be Qādir and Mukhtār:
This universe is Hādith, and its creator is Qadīm. Therefore, He cannot be Mūjab. If Allah is Mūjab, His effect would accompany His existence. Hence, the creation would have to be Qadīm too, while we proved that the creation is Hādith.

We believe that Allah’s power includes everything possible. If something is impossible to exist, it doesn’t make Allah’s power limited. If something is bad, His power includes it, but He would not do it because of His good essence.

Allah’s power includes anything feasible
Allah’s power includes anything feasible because the reason why Mumkināt need God is contingency. After proving Allah’s power as a principle, we should talk about its extent. In proving Allah’s inclusive power, Allama Hillī has disagreed with philosophers as they argue “God is one, and only one can be created by God.” There is a rule in philosophy which argues “When you have a cause which is one in every aspect, what can be created and originated from it is also one. Multiple cannot be created by one.” Fāḍil Miqdād says, “This rule is against the unicity of Wājib al-Wujūd.” (This is Fāḍil Miqdād’s explanation of this rule, but philosophers have another explanation.)
He also disagreed with dualism. Dualists argue that God does not have power over doing bad things. Balkhī argued “It’s not possible that God’s power belongs to something like what our power belongs to; such as walking.” Jubbāīs believed that it is impossible for God’s power to belong to the exact things that our power belongs to. We disagree with both; we believe that His power is not limited, and He is capable over doing evil. Therefore, there is no obstacle for Him, however he doesn’t commit evil.

Why is there no obstacle in His essence?
Allah’s essence with respect to all feasible acts has equal relation because His essence is simple, not multiple and material. Therefore, what His essence implies and entitles must be simple too.

Why is there no obstacle for Him in committing evil?
What causes a feasible act to become so is contingency. Contingency is common among all of creation. Therefore, all contingent beings are feasible. Hence, Allah’s power is inclusive of all feasible things. However, the occurrence of every feasible existent doesn’t come out of belonging. What is caused directly by Allah (SWT) is some of the feasible things, not all of them.
Ash‘arites agree with us in that His power includes everything. However, we do not agree with them in their claim that Allah does everything which is possible for him.

The Second Affirmative Attribute; Allah’s Knowledge
The second affirmative attribute is His knowledge. The reason why Allah has knowledge of this world is because it has been created by Allah (SWT). By its wonderful design it shows the knowledge of its Creator. It also shows the will of its Creator because the world is Hādith. Therefore, the fact that it was created at a certain point shows the will of the Creator. God has performed firm and articulate actions and whoever does something perfectly must have knowledge. Therefore, creation cannot be the result of chance.

Terminology:
Ālim; one who has knowledge.
Mutqan; something unique and wonderful with many effects and properties.

Two arguments for proving God’s knowledge:
1. We already proved that He is Mukhtār (Free). The fact that He is Mukhtār proves that He is aware of what He chooses to do. Every Mukhtār must have knowledge because the action of the one who has will power, follows his will, and it is impossible to will something without knowing it.
2. Allah has committed firm actions and whoever does firm actions much have knowledge. Whoever ponders on His creation realizes that they are Mutqan. Even considering the creation of mankind or even one organ of the human body, it is sufficient to say that there must be wisdom behind creation.
It is also self-evident that whoever does such firm actions must have knowledge.

We believe that His knowledge belongs to everything that can be known because everything has equal relation to Allah (SWT) as they are all His creatures.
Allah is alive, and every living being has the potential to know everything. In regard to Allah, everything potential perfection becomes necessary. Therefore, He must know everything. If we say that ‘God can have something, but He doesn’t have it yet’ then it means that he relies on something to gain it; this would result in contingency of God.
Therefore, philosophers say “When something is a necessary existent in its essence, all attributes become necessary for Him unless it is an imperfect attribute”.
Regarding the problem of Allah knowing only certain things, we believe that what is changing is the relation of Allah’s knowledge about creation.

Why Allah Must Have Knowledge of Everything Possible
The reason why He knows everything which is possible for Him to know is because He is living, and it is possible for everything alive to know. This potentiality is for possible existents only because it is not possible for Allah as the necessary existent to not be aware of his own creation that is always contingent on Him.

Why Every Possible Perfection is Necessary for Allah
The second claim is that everything which is possible for Him to have is actually necessary. God’s actions are essential, and all essential attributes are necessary. Also, there is no way for God to become more perfect. If it is not necessarily essential, it would mean that God, the incontingent, is contingent because there is a perfection which He lacks, and He would need to get it from another source. This assumption contradicts the fact that God is Wājib al-Wujūd.

Another attribute of perfection is Hayāt or life. The argument is that being alive is a perfection compared to being dead. God is the most perfect being and every perfection comes from Him. To give life, the giver must first possess it himself. Therefore, because all life comes from Him, He must be alive and likewise for any other attribute of perfection.

Allah is living because He is Mukhtār and knowledgeable. Philosophers and Abul Hasan al-Basrī (one of the Mutakallimīn) said Hayāt is the same thing which has been described to be powerful and knowledgeable. Ash‘arites believe that Hayāt is an additional attribute to His essence. However, the truth is what philosophers and Abul Hasan al-Basrī have argued. This is because what Ash‘arites argue implies acceptance of addition to Allah while the basic judgment of reason is that Allah cannot have anything extra added to Him as He is perfect. Therefore, as we cannot imagine anything that has power and knowledge without life, we can safely conclude that whatever has these must have life. Therefore, Allah is living because He has knowledge and power.

The Third and Fourth Attributes: Irādah and Kirāhah
The next attribute is that Allah has Irādah and Kirāhah, which means there are certain things that God wills and there are certain things which He doesn’t will. When it is said that some actions weren’t existent and then they were performed, it means there must be will power. Reason is that performance of an action requires decision and willingness. Therefore, since God has acted, it proves that he has Iradah and He decides what to do and not to do.
He also wants us to observe His will.

Bukhārī said, “Irādah means that God is not forced to do something. According to him, the meaning of Irādah is not positive, but negative. He has taken what is implied instead of what it implies. The fact that God is not forced, is implied by Irādah, but the real meaning is what implies it. Balkhī said, “When we use Irādah for divine actions, the meaning is knowledge, and when we use it for what He asked us to do, the meaning is command.” If he meant general knowledge, not specific, it is not Irādah (as we will explain) but if he meant knowledge about interest in actions, this is the same as Abul Hasan Basrī’s opinion. Command is different from Irādah. When Allah commands, it shows that He has Irādah, but they are not the same.
Ash‘ariets, Mu‘tazilites and Karrāmiyyah have said “Irādah is an attribute that is external and additional to His knowledge, but this is a quality that specifies actions to what and when it should be done.” Then Ash‘ariets said “This external attribute is eternal.” Mu‘tazilites and Karrāmiyyah who didn’t believe in multiple eternal beings said, “It is Hādith, something which has been created.” Then Karrāmiyyah said “This is a Hadīth which depends on the essence of God. Mu‘tazilites believed that it is Hādith however it doesn’t have any subject it can belong to. We will discuss later why this view is wrong. Irādah is not something external to the essence of God. Therefore, the correct view is what Abul Hasan Basrī believed.

Argument for Proving Allah’s Irādah
1. Although creating is the same for God at all times and conditions, to specify actions for creating them in certain times and conditions shows that there must be something that has made this specification possible, and that something is His Irādah or will.
If we argue that it is an essential attribute which has made specifying actions possible, it would not be correct as the attribute would have equal relation with all times and conditions. Therefore, it’s not able to make such specification because the role of power is to influence and create, not to bring preference.
Also, general knowledge cannot cause plans of action. It only defines what is possible to do, and it follows actions. Otherwise, we would have to say that knowledge necessitates following, which is logically impossible.
Other attributes also don’t explain the cause of specifying actions. Therefore, the only reason which remains is special knowledge that defines what possibilities are present. That special knowledge is knowledge about interest that cannot be achieved unless in specific times and conditions. This knowledge precedes creating.

1. About God’s command: it is obvious that Allah has commanded some actions and prohibited others. Commanding to do something shows Allah’s Irādah and will. Prohibiting some actions also shows that Allah doesn’t will for those actions. Therefore, Allah has both Irādah and Kirāhah.

Some essential points
1. Allah’s Kirāhah shows, what is prohibited contains Mafsadah or harms. Therefore, He doesn’t will for them, while Irādah means He knows the purpose in actions and that’s why He commits them.
2. His Irādah is not additional to His essence. Otherwise, it would lead to one of the following possibilities:
A) Either it had to be eternal as Ash‘arites said, which is wrong because it implies multiple eternal beings which is impossible.
B) It is Hādith and it belongs to His essence. This assumption implies that Allah’s essence is also Hādith because it is subject to change. This is impossible.
C) It is hādith and it belongs to something outside of His essence. It means that Irādah is not really an attribute of God, but the attribute of something else.
D) If we argue that there is no subject for it, there would be two problems:
1. It requires accepting an endless regression, because that Hādith must be preceded by the will of what created it and what creates needs Irādah. This Irādah is also Hādith then begins the infinite regression that is logically void.
2. There cannot be any attribute without a subject to belong to.

Also, the Quran says:

لَّا تُدْرِكُهُ الْأَبْصَارُ وَهُوَ يُدْرِكُ الْأَبْصَارَ وَهُوَ اللَّطِيفُ الْخَبِيرُ
“The sights do not apprehend Him, yet He apprehends the sights, and He is the All-attentive, the All-aware.” (6:103)

 Meaning of Idrāk
Scripture based arguments indicate that, He is Mudrik. Idrāk is something more than knowledge because we obviously find a distinction between e.g. our knowledge of white and black and our perception of them. This difference is because of the influence of the color on our senses. However, intellectual arguments have proved that it is not possible to assume physical senses or instruments of knowledge for Allah (SWT). So, with respect, Allah (SWT) is a matter of knowledge but knowledge of what can be sensed by human beings.
The reason for the fact that Allah swt knows everything is that He is alive, and it is possible for Him to understand, and in philosophy it is proved that any possible perfection for Allah is necessary.

The Sixth Attribute: Qadīm, Azalī, Bāqī, and Abadī
The next attributes are that Allah is Qadīm, Azalī, Bāqī and Abadī. He is not preceded or followed by non-existence. Qadīm means not to be preceded by non-existence. Sometimes for which there is no time before it, in which it didn’t exist, and sometimes there is not even any possibility of assuming time before it; this is Azalī.
These four qualities are necessary for Wājib al-Wujūd. Qadīm and Azalī which means that there is no time before Allah’s existence. One cannot suppose any time before Him.
Al- Bāqī, the one who remains, is the one who accompanies all time.
Abadī is more inclusive and it also includes time which you can imagine in the future. The reason why Allah has these four attributes is that He is Wājib al-Wujūd. It is impossible for Wājib al-Wujūd to be preceded or followed by nonexistence.

The Seventh Attribute: Mutakillim
The seventh attribute is Mutakillim (Speaking). All Islamic scholars have agreed upon the fact that Allah is Mutakillim. However, they disagreed on four issues:
1. Proving God’s Kalām
The first one, through intellectual argumentation and scripture-based arguments that He speaks. Ash‘arites believe that the way to prove this is intellectual reasoning, and Mu‘tazilites believed that the reason is scripture based:

وَكَلَّمَ اللَّـهُ مُوسَى تَكْلِيمًا
“And to Moses Allah spoke directly.” (4: 164)

The idea of Mu‘tazilites is true because there is no intellectual reason for that, and the arguments that have been used to prove that rationally God speaks is not complete. All the prophets had consensus on that God speaks, because all of them claimed that God had spoken to them, and to prove their prophethood does not depend on this point, because it is possible to argue for their prophethood by some reasons other than Quran.

1. The Reality of Allah’s Kalām
   The second disagreement is the reality of what Allah’s Kalām is. Ash‘arites say it is an eternal concept that depends on Allah’s essence. This eternal concept is expressed by using different expressions, and it is different from knowledge and power. It’s not a matter of sounds or letters either.
   Mu‘tazilites, Hanābilah, and Karrāmiyyah say God’s Kalām is not eternal, rather it is a combination of letters and sounds in the way that it suggests some meaning. This view is correct because it is in compliance with the common understanding of what speaking is.
   The second reason is that, what Ash‘arites have said is not possible to be conceived. According to them, Allah has essential power to create sounds and letters However Ash’arites have said His speaking is not His power. Also, we can understand His knowledge, but they have said Allah’s Kalām is different form His knowledge too. The two other disagreements are not important for discussion.
   In conclusion, when we say that God speaks, it means that He creates sounds and letters, or He has knowledge and power to create them.

The Last Affirmative Attribute: Truthfulness
The last affirmative attribute is that Allah is truthful. Being truthful means informing in the way that corresponds to the reality. Lying is the opposite. Allah is truthful because He is not liar. Lying is self-evidently bad, immoral, and blameworthy. Also lying is a matter of deficiency. We cannot attribute something immoral or any deficiency to Allah, because we will prove later that He, as the necessary existent, is free from any deficiency.

The First Negational Attribute: Being Compound
The first negational attribute is that God is not a compound because otherwise He would be dependent on His parts. Combination is sometimes external like physical objects are a combination of physical substances or they are mental, like the combination of essences and definition. Every compound whether external or mental needs its parts because its existence is reliant on the parts. Parts of a compound is different from the compound itself and everything compound is contingent on its parts to exist.

The Second Negational Attribute: Jism
The second negational attribute is that God is not Jism or physical object unlike Mujassimah, who assumed that He is Jism. He is neither substance nor accident (Juhar and ‘Arad). Jism is something that has length, width, and depth. ‘Arad is something that dwells in Jism. It cannot exist without its subject.

Two arguments for God not being Jism:
1. If God was Jism or ‘Arad, He would have been contingent.
Every physical object needs space and every ‘Arad needs subject. Space is different from Jism itself, and subject is different from ‘Arad itself. It means that Jism and ‘Arad need something other than themselves.

1. If God was Jism, He would be Hādith.
   Physical objects are not free from changes and whatever is not free from changes is Hādith while we have proved that God is Qadīm.

It is also impossible for God to dwell in something as Christians believe because then God would be dependent. What we can understand from dwelling in something is relying on something as a subordinate. This meaning is wrong for God. He also is in no direction in the sense that He is limited in directions. Direction is the destination when you are moving or the point of indication. Karrāmiyyah thought that God is above us. This idea is false, because if God has direction, He either needs that direction or He does not. If He needs it, He would be contingent. If He doesn’t need it, we should not say that God is in that direction.

After we have concluded that it is impossible for God to have Jism, we must interpret the texts of Quran and Hadīth that contradict this conclusion.

Immaterial Pleasure Applies to God
Some people, mainly philosophers, believe that there is a possibility of thinking that immaterial or abstract pleasure applies for Allah. Allah understands Himself, something that is the greatest means of pleasure due to perfection. This immaterial pleasure is called Bahjah. He doesn’t need to gain this Bahjah from any other than himself.

Some perfections are good for contingent beings, which are not suitable for Allah, but any type of perfection that is absolute and unlimited is suitable for Allah.
Philosophers have this view that because Allah has the quality of perfection that suits Him, and it is impossible to have deficiency in perfection. Therefore, If Allah doesn’t have this understanding of Himself, it is a deficiency. He is the best of those who understands the best thing understood in the best way of understanding.
There is a consensus among all the scholars that Allah doesn’t suffer from any pain because there is nothing unpleasant that can bring pain to Allah (SWT) as He does not have any physical body which such pain can be applied to.
Mutakallim reject the possibility of Allah having pleasure and pain, even the intellectual pleasure. They either don’t believe in any intellectual pleasure or because such concept has not been discussed in the Islamic scriptures. They believe that they can use only those names and attributes for God which are taken from the scripture.

The Fourth Negational Attribute: Ittihād
The next negational attribute is Ittihād or combination. There are two types of Ittihād: metaphoric and real. The metaphoric Ittihād is when something becomes something else either by gradual changes or by adding something else into it. There is no real combination here.
The real Ittihād is when two things get mixed and produce a third thing. Neither real nor metaphoric combination is applicable to God. The real combination is impossible for God because God doesn’t change gradually to something else nor anything can be added to Him. The reason for the impossibility of Ittihād is that after mixing two things, if they still exist, there is no real mixing, and if they don’t exist anymore, there is no combination of two things unless a third being has come into existence. At the level of Allah, this is impossible because there is nothing that can be even next to Him, let alone to be mixed with Allah.

There are two ways to consider qualities of God; one is to look at the qualities of God in His essence like His essential power and knowledge. The other is to look at the belonging of these qualities with what is related to them, e.g. knowledge needs something to be known. There is no disagreement that when you consider these belongings of these qualities, they are relational and changeable because what they are based on changes e.g. knowledge of a being changes as the being changes.

Karrāmiyyah’s point of view on this topic:
Regarding the first way of considering God’s attributes, Karrāmiyyah believed that Allah’s essential qualities are renewed according to the changes of their belongings. They believed “Allah (SWT) in eternity was not powerful then He became powerful when He created.” The truth is different from what they believed because what is renewed is not His essential qualities but the belonging of these qualities that are abstract in our minds.
If Karrāmiyyah meant that God in His essence lacked power and knowledge, it is false for two reasons:
The first reason is that if God’s attributes were Hādith, it implies that God changes. What is implied is false, thus what implies is also false because:
1. God’s qualities are essential and if they change then the essence itself would change too.
2. To receive a new quality by God, He needs a potential to receive it. It means that God didn’t have this capacity in the past and now He has gained it. It implies a change in God’s essence, which is impossible.

The second reason is that Allah’s qualities are perfections because it is impossible for God to have any deficiency. If God doesn’t have a quality of perfection and He gains it later, it means that He didn’t have this perfection before and was imperfect and deficient.

The Sixth Negational Attribute: Invisibility.
The sixth negational attribute is that He is not seen. Every visible thing has direction because it is in front of you either directly or indirectly. It means that whatever is seen must be limited to a direction, and it is impossible for God to be physical and limited. It is also mentioned in Quran:
لَن تَرَانِي
‘You shall not see Me.’ (7:143)

Some of the Ash‘raites have argued “We can see God, but without having an image of God in our eyes. By seeing God, we mean that condition of seeing something and knowing about it.” Some others have argued “Seeing God means that on the Day of Judgment, God will reveal Himself for His believer servants like a complete moon.” The truth is if they mean that we will have complete presence of God, it is agreed. If they mean anything else, it’s a matter of seeing which is impossible.